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1) Introduction
A large literature has investigated the role of collective action among firms. For a long time, this literature has focused on business associations as rent-seeking special interest groups (Olson 1965 (Olson , 1982 . By lobbying for preferential policies, so the argument goes, these groups advance their own benefit, but often harm the greater good as business resources are used up for lobbying efforts and state resources are not distributed in an optimal way (Krueger 1974; Bhagwati 1982) .
More recently, a new line of research has started to emphasize the potential positive effects that organized business can have on economic efficiency, public welfare and economic development (Doner and Schneider 2000) . Especially in the development economics literature, the importance of well-functioning links and feedback mechanisms between state and business has increasingly been emphasized (Evans 1995 , Maxfield and Schneider 1997 , Cali et al. 2011 . Business associations play an important role in this respect by aggregating business interests and providing a platform for informational exchange and networking, but also by protecting firms and entrepreneurs from predatory or corrupt state officials. They can even become a catalyst for overall institutional improvement by contributing to the transition from a
limited to an open access order, as pointed out by North, Wallis and Weingast (2009, page 140 ff.) in their book on violence and social orders.
While the empirical and case-study literature on the role of domestic business associations is quite substantial, much less has been written about the role of business associations and collective action by foreign investors. However, if we consider the reasons commonly advanced why firms join a business association, foreign investors might often have an even stronger interest than their domestic competitors to join some form of collective organization. While domestic firms join a business association to lower the costs of lobbying, to gain access to networks and information or to find some sort of protection in the case of state predation, foreign investors have to struggle with a range of additional problems such as the language barrier or an insufficient understanding of local business practices, the bureaucratic and political context and the general rules of the game, all of which puts them at a disadvantage with respect to their domestic competitors. Joining a business association in the country they plan to invest in might be a way to address these problems.
Indeed, a sizable cross-country literature has shown that foreign firms often do exercise a substantive amount of political influence, especially in developing and transition countries (Jensen 2006; Desbordes and Vauday 2007; Li 2011) . But what are 4 the channels and mechanisms they use to advance their interests? How do they organize, and what is the role of foreign business associations in this respect?
In this paper, we are going to study collective action by foreign investors with a focus on foreign business associations in the Russian Federation. In a first step, we will ask why firms organize, and how effective different types of collective action are for foreign investors. What is the added value for a foreign firm to join its national business association in a foreign country, for example the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce for a firm that wants to invest in Russia but has its headquarters in the UK? Are national business associations the most important mechanism or only one among many that foreign investors use to advance their interests? To answer these questions we focus on three particular sets of services that business associations typically provide for their members, namely assistance for individual firms in the case of administrative and other kinds of problems in the host country, provision of informational services and access to networks, and the role business associations play in lobbying for and advancing the collective interests of their members.
In a second part, we will then focus on the economic and institutional outcomes of collective action abroad. With respect to the academic debate on the positive and negative effects of business lobbying, we will try to see if collective action by foreign investors in Russia can rather be characterized as attempts by narrow interest groups to advance their individual objectives, or if through some kind of economic and institutional spillovers the overall effects are positive for society at large. Do we observe a dialogue between domestic institutions at the regional or national level and foreign business associations that could assume the form of a catalyst for institutional change, such as described for example by North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) For a number of reasons, Russia is a particularly well-suited context to study these questions. An emerging economy with still a lot of potential for investors despite recent geopolitical events, Russia is also characterized by a set of incomplete and often contradictory institutions that make it difficult for first-time investors to navigate the country's economy and administrative system. Foreign business associations can thus potentially play an important role in supporting firms that plan to or have started to invest in Russia. In addition, the heterogeneity of Russia's more 5 than 80 regions provides us with a lot of regional variation while overall characteristics such as language or national legislation are kept constant, which permits us to avoid the pitfalls often encountered by cross-country studies.
For our study, we conducted interviews with leading representatives of 17 foreign business associations based in Moscow, as well as with a number of high ranking foreign and Russian stakeholders that are actively involved in the dialogue between the Russian government, Russian business and foreign investors. The interviews were conducted between late 2014 and September 2015. Our interviews were complemented by an online survey of firms organized in foreign business associations, which was carried out during spring 2015. Although we had initially planned this study before the onset of the Ukraine crisis, the difficulties resulting for foreign firms in Russia from the current political climate and international sanctions have added an additional element of interest to our paper, as we are now also in a position to investigate to what extent foreign business associations can help foreign investors to weather the storm.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on collective action among firms, both domestic and foreign, with a special focus on Russia. Section 3 presents our methodology and summary statistics of the data we collected, and provides an overview of how foreign business associations are organized in the Russian Federation. Section 4 reviews how well these associations do in helping their members to solve problems, in providing information and access to networks, and in lobbying for the collective interest of their member firms. Section 5 revisits the debate about the positive and negative welfare effects of collective action by foreign investors in light of our findings, and section 6 concludes.
2) Literature Review
Why do firms organize? For some time, a debate has been ongoing that opposes the potentially harmful outcomes from business lobbying to the positive effects of collective action by firms and entrepreneurs. In The Rise and Decline of Nations (1982) , Mancur Olson advanced the argument that the less encompassing are groups, the more likely they are to lobby for the kind of rents and special benefits that are profitable to them but harmful to the rest of society. While Olson has focused on the Western world and Japan in his study, Pyle and Solanko (2013) have found empirical evidence supporting Olson's hypothesis for a former socialist country, by surveying managers of Russian regional business lobbies and Russian industrial enterprises. 6 This line of research would suggest that those business associations representing a relatively narrow range of interests have a higher tendency to engage in rent-seeking activities and in attempts to limit market competition than more encompassing associations.
On the other hand, in particular in contexts with incomplete markets and institutions collective action by businesses can also play a positive role, in providing the kind of knowledge and services that formal institutions and the market are not able to provide. Both Duvanova (2007 Duvanova ( , 2011 Duvanova ( , 2013 and Pyle (2006) have found evidence that overall the kind of business organizations existing in contemporary Russia are primarily of this second type, while Peng (2001) argues that the promotion of networking by business associations in a number of transition economies has made important contributions to wealth creation in these countries. A growing literature looking at China also identified collective action by both state-owned and private businesses as playing an important role in enhancing the effectiveness of statebusiness links, for example by providing feedback mechanisms to improve the quality of economic laws and regulations (Kennedy 2005; Zhang 2007; Deng and Kennedy 2010) .
It thus seems that while less encompassing groups are more likely to lobby for special interests irrespective of the institutional context, collective action by businesses per se might rather play a positive role in environments characterized by incomplete institutions. For example, a number of studies have found that collective action helps businesses to defend themselves against attacks by predatory and corrupt state agencies (Pyle 2011; Markus 2012 Markus , 2015 Yakovlev et al. 2014 , Kazun 2015 . Indeed, Pyle (2011) shows how business collective action can serve as a substitute for protection by political institutions in those Russian regions that are less politically competitive. Especially in contexts like Russia that to this date are characterized by a high level of violent and predatory pressure against businessmen both at the hands of criminal groups and various state actors (Belokurova 2014; Rochlitz 2014; Markus 2015) , the possibility to appeal to a business organization for protection might be quite valuable. One example is the organization "Business against Corruption" (BaC), which was set up by the Russian business organization "Delovaya Rossiya" in 2011 to defend businesses in Russia against the activity of corporate raiders and predatory state agencies (Yakovlev et al. 2014 , Kazun 2015 .
Although the amount of cases where BaC was able to successfully defend a business under attack has remained limited to date, the organization remains an example of a possible catalyst for larger institutional change.
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Another service business associations can provide to their members is the provision of information and access to networks. Efficient networks with non-market stakeholders can help foreign firms to obtain relevant information, accelerate administrative decision-making and reduce political risks (Peng 2001; Holtbruegge and Puck 2009) . Business associations can play an important role in this respect as a platform for information exchange and networking. This can be especially important for foreign investors that just started investing, as they might initially still lack the personal networks and connections crucial for successful business activity in contexts characterized by incomplete institutions (Batjargal 2007; Heikkila and Salmi 2015) .
Perhaps the most frequent activity to be associated with business associations is lobbying. From the literature on lobbying, we know that certain firms are more likely to engage in lobbying activities and have higher bargaining power than others.
Looking at a large sample of 20000 firms in developing and transition countries, Weymouth (2012) finds that lobbying and policy influence increase with a firm's size and market power. Similarly, state-owned firms seem likely to have better access to public officials than privately owned firms, and firms with many employees seem to be able to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state by trading favourable legislation for support at the ballot box or keeping people employed (Frye 2002; Aisbett and McAusland 2013; Frye et al. 2014) . Firms in the tradables sector and those that export are also found to exercise stronger political influence (Yasar et al 2011; Yasar 2013) , as are firms that observe that their competitors have influence on policy (Kanol 2015) , whereas industry concentration does not seem to play a role (Barber et al. 2014 ).
While differences in bargaining power can be an important determinant why firms choose to lobby through business associations instead of engaging in direct lobbying, this decision seems also to be influenced by the institutional environment. For instance, in Russian regions with higher levels of political competition, firms are found to be more likely to lobby through business associations than to engage in direct lobbying (Pyle 2011 , Govorun et al. 2013 ).
The institutional context seems also to influence the general effectiveness of lobbying, although here the results are less clear cut. While Choi et al. (2014) find that lobbying seems to be less effective in countries with higher levels of political competition, Weymouth (2012) identifies that firms surveyed in the World Bank's Enterprise Survey report greater policy influence in democracies than in non-democracies.
Concerning foreign investors and multinational companies (MNCs), Li (2011) finds them to be less influential over public policy in democracies than in autocracies, 8 while at the domestic level MNCs are found to have more bargaining power than purely domestically oriented host firms. The often powerful role played by foreign investors, especially in contexts with relatively weak host governments is also identified by Desbordes and Vauday (2007) , who looking at a sample of 48 developing countries find that foreign firms derive substantial fiscal and regulatory advantages from their political influence and from their ability to negotiate superior entry conditions. While these studies mostly use cross-country data, surveys and case studies that look at lobbying and collective action by foreign investors in a single context remain relatively rare (Chen 2004 or Luo 2007 on the strategies used by MNCs in China are an exception). In this paper, we will therefore focus on collective action by foreign investors in a single country characterized by incomplete institutions, the Russian Federation. We will study to what extent foreign business associations provide assistance in the case of problems with state officials and domestic competitors, what role they play in providing informational services and access to networks, and to what extent these associations are used by foreign investors as a way to coordinate lobbying activities. Looking at these three topics will then permit us to answer the questions asked at the beginning of this paper, i.e. to what extent collective action by foreign investors is welfare-enhancing in the context we study, and to what extent this kind of collective action might display the negative welfare effects first described by Mancur Olson (1965 Olson ( , 1982 .
3) Methodology and Data
For the purpose of this study, we conducted a series of interviews with leading representatives of 17 foreign business associations based in Moscow, as well as with a number of foreign and Russian stakeholders involved in the dialogue between the Russian government, Russian business and foreign investors 3 . We then also gathered 9 After conducting the interviews with a representative of each association, we coded the information gathered for each association with respect to the association's internal organization and activity, contacts to other foreign and Russian business associations, contacts with Russian federal and regional institutions and officials, as well as with respect to personal characteristics of the respondent who gave the interview. This coded information was then used as the basis for our analysis in section 4 below.
In addition to the interview, we also asked each association for the possibility to conduct an online survey among its member firms. The survey was designed with the help of the online survey tool "Survey Monkey" (www.surveymonkey.com), and included up to 40 questions (depending on the type of answers, the amount of questions varied slightly) 6 . Each association was asked to distribute the survey link through their mailing list among their member firms, with the request that the 11 survey be answered only by a top-manager of the respective firm. While 12 associations agreed to send the survey link to their members, we only got a usable amount of answers for 6 associations. Table 2 presents summary statistics for these 6 associations.
As with 116 respondents the survey only resulted in a relatively small number of answers which are not statistically representative in nature, we only use it to motivate some of the questions asked in sections 4 and as an indicative source of evidence. Nevertheless, the fact that the number of replies is relatively evenly spread across sectors (table 3) and across small, medium-sized and large enterprises, of which a relatively large number either provide services or have production or R&D facilities inside Russia (table 2) makes us confident that at least as a source of indicative evidence the survey still has its use. 
4) Results
Why are firms joining their national business association in a foreign country? To answer this question, we first look why foreign investors come to Russia in the first place (table 4) . The results from our firm survey are relatively straightforward. It seems that the possibility to access the Russian market as well as the high profitability of investments in Russia have attracted foreign firms to the country, while other factors such as low labour costs, the availability of natural resources or the regulatory environment play only a minor role. The first of the three main functions of business associations that we intend to study in this paper is their role in assisting individual member firms with problems encountered with the Russian authorities, for example with respect to taxes, custom rules and other regulations, but also concerning problems such as corruption, violent pressure or other predatory practices by state officials, which have been identified as significant problems faced by domestic businesses in the country (see e.g. Markus 2015). Table 6 presents an overview of the main difficulties faced by the firms we surveyed during the first year they operated in Russia. Interestingly, it is primarily problems with regulation and custom clearance that were cited as the primary obstacles firms faced, while corruption remains a problem but seems less important in comparison. One the other hand, security is not mentioned as a primary concern, which is also reflected in the relatively low amounts of annual turnover spent on payments for security per year (table 7). right. This is the kind of analytical work we are doing at the moment."
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Helping their member firms to navigate a fast changing regulatory environment by analysing, interpreting and providing information on new rules and regulations thus appeared as a key service offered by foreign business associations. On the other hand, problems with predatory behaviour by state agencies did not surface in the interviews we conducted, apart from a couple of recent examples linked mostly to the current political climate, thus confirming the results from our online survey.
While insecure property rights remain a problem for domestic firms in Russia (Kazun 2015 , Markus 2015 , it seems that for foreign investors this is no longer as important an issue as it was during the early days of economic transition in the country.
The various problems faced by foreign investors in Russia are also reflected in the way they evaluate the importance of services provided by their respective national business association ( in their home country, as for example the Japanese association Rotobo which regularly invites groups of Russian investors to Japan.
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In an interview we conducted with a representative of a leading foreign firm in the natural resource sector, our interviewee confirmed that it is mainly for the networking and information services that his company is a member of several foreign business associations in Russia. He maintained that while for small and medium firms the assistance and lobbying functions may also be of significant importance, big companies most often have their own possibilities of direct access to Russian government officials, but still profit from the networking opportunities provided by national business associations. He also underlined that at least in certain sectors such as in the natural resource, automobile or chemical industries sectoral associations often play a more important role than national business associations in lobbying for certain policies and in providing a platform for an exchange of opinions between state and business actors.
Indeed, it seems to be the case that most foreign investors are not only a member of their own national business association, but are also in addition members in sometimes several other business associations (table 9) . While 19% of firms were member of at least one other national business association, 21% were members in the Association of European Businesses (AEB), 10% in a sectoral association, and 9% in the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. As all these associations charge membership fees that are not huge but often large enough to be noticeable (on average around 1000 US dollars for a mid-sized firm per year, although the amount of membership fees varies widely between associations), it seems that the functions that these associations fulfil are indeed appreciated and something firms are ready to pay for.
On the other hand, with respect to day-to-day business activities in Russian regions business associations seem to play a less important role, with only 3% of firms being a member in a regional association, for example. Asked about the relative importance of different contacts and institutions for their work in Russian regions, direct contacts with regional officials and especially with Russian partner firms appear to be much more important to foreign investors than links with business associations or regional chambers of commerce (table 10). their members with problems and providing information and networking services, we will now look at their role played in advancing and lobbying the collective interest of their member firms. Using the current political situation as a kind of natural experiment, we will do this by looking at the way different associations reacted to the current political and economic crisis caused by the recent events in Ukraine.
We find that the crisis does indeed significantly affect the circumstances in which foreign firms do business in the country. For 25% of respondents the business climate has become somewhat and for 39% significantly worse during the last three years (table 11) . Similarly, for 76,5% of firms in our survey the direct effects of the crisis led to a somewhat or even a significant worsening of their situation, while an additional 9,5% actually had to stop their activities in Russia or are considering to leave the country in the near future (table 12). In such a situation, foreign business associations could therefore -at least in theoryplay an important role in communicating the difficulties their member firms are suffering from both to the Russian and their home country authorities, by lobbying for example against the imposition of further economic sanctions, or for cancelation of existing ones. Interestingly, the foreign business associations we surveyed differed markedly in the way they reacted to the crisis.
Some of our respondents were very vocal in condemning the sanctions and countersanctions, making it clear that they were critically voicing their concerns whenever they had the possibility to do so. For example, as Italian food producers had been suffering significantly by the counter-sanctions imposed by the Russian government, the head of the Italian business association had been actively criticizing the economic conflict between Russia and the West, both in Russia and at home. Other associations, especially those from East Asia but also for example the Finnish association, maintained that as a business association they had to remain strictly 21 neutral, by restricting their activities to business related issues and not voicing their concerns publicly. Only four associations however, namely the German, American, British and European association, seemed to be engaged in some sort of systematic effort to make the interests of their member firms heard by decision makers in Russia.
Despite various efforts by these larger associations to collectively voice the concerns of the foreign business community, our respondents remained pessimistic with respect to the potential success of such collective initiatives in the current situation.
One representative of a major business association told us that the problem was not in obtaining access to economic decision-makers in the country. He maintained that all of the major foreign business associations continue to have a good working relationship with the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Economic Development.
The problem rather seemed to be that although Russia's economic decision-makers well understood the concerns of the business community, knew what to do to solve these problems and were willing to solve them, they were unable to do so because their ability to take decisions had been severely restricted by a small group of people close to the presidential administration and the security ministries who did care only to a limited extent about the concerns of the business community. In the words of our 
5) Discussion
In view of these findings, what can we say about the welfare effects of collective action by foreign investors in the context of the Russian Federation? In our study, we did not find any evidence that associations of foreign firms act as rent-seeking special interest groups, in the sense of Olson (1965 Olson ( , 1982 , Krueger (1974) and Bhagwati (1982) . While only a few big associations had the institutional ability to lobby special interests before the onset of the current crisis, the current political situation seems to have further limited their ability to influence legislative and political decisionmaking in Russia. Moreover, the lobbying activity that did take place was mostly directed at removing barriers and regulations that were harmful to the business community at large, such as for example attempts by the American Chamber of
Commerce to remove or weaken the Jackson-Vanik amendment in the US (before it was replaced by the Magnitsky Act in 2012). Other examples where foreign business associations tried to voice their concern were a new Russian law on compulsory deposits for foreign credit card companies, or new rules forcing internet firms to store data about Russian citizens on Russian territory. In both cases, the laws were adopted very fast, and would have caused significant economic harm had they actually been enforced. While lobbying by business associations did not have any visible impact on the legislative process at first, the laws were ultimately not enforced as the negative economic consequences would indeed have been significant.
As opposed to the rather limited role played by foreign associations in lobbying the collective interests of their member firms, a very important role is the provision of information. In helping their member firms to navigate an environment characterized by high levels of institutional and regulatory uncertainty, the business associations we surveyed permitted their members to spend resources on wealth creation rather than on trying to individually understand Russia's often opaque and fast changing regulatory environment. In providing informational and networking services to their members, as well as through exchanging information between different foreign and domestic business associations and therefore creating synergy effects in the gathering and analysis of information, these associations played an important role in advancing the collective understanding of Russia's business environment among foreign and domestic firms in the country.
Indeed, an important element we have observed during our study was the active exchange of information among different associations and organizations. In addition to providing information, foreign business associations also played an important role in supporting their member firms in the case of problems with Russian regulatory authorities. One important difference to the role played by domestic Russian associations is that foreign associations seem no longer have to assist their member firms in the defense against predatory state agencies, criminal groups and raiding attacks. For example, while a high number of Russian-owned firms still appeal each year to the Russian business association "Business against Corruption" (BaC) for protection against criminal and violent raiding attacks, almost no foreign owned firms did appeal to BaC for protection since its inception in 2011 (Kazun 2015) . In our interviews and our survey, we also did not find any evidence that insecure property rights are still a problem for foreign investors. An exception are the risks inherent to Russia's volatile political situation at the international level, for example with respect to Turkish investors whose situation in Russia has significantly deteriorated as a consequence of the recent crisis between both countries, a development that was both fast and largely unpredictable.
In sum, while the current political situation in Russia has at least temporarily weakened the influence of both the "liberal" wing in the government and Russian and foreign businesses, there is a lot of evidence showing how foreign business associations together with their domestic Russian counterparts do nevertheless play an important role in trying to create a more open and business friendly environment.
In this sense, they indeed might play a role as catalysts for gradual institutional change from a limited to a more open access order as described by North, Wallis and 24 Weingast (2009), even though in the short term it looks as if Russia is moving into the opposite direction. Here the ability of both foreign and domestic businesses to collectively advance their interests against an oligarchic elite that is trying to keep a limited access order in place might play a key role in the future.
6) Conclusion
Based on our firm survey and the interviews we conducted for our study, we found that foreign business associations do indeed play an important role for foreign investors in the context of a country characterized by still incomplete and often contradictory institutions, the Russian Federation. Foreign business associations in Russia assist their member firms in case of problems encountered with the bureaucratic and regulatory framework, and provide them with informational services and opportunities to establish contacts with Russian officials, firms and other important stakeholders. In this sense, we find that the role they play is largely welfare enhancing not only for their members but also in more general terms, along
the lines of what has been found by earlier studies on the role of business associations in transition economies (Pyle 2011 , Duvanova 2007 .
Indeed, the ability of foreign business associations in Russia to advance the narrower interests of their member firms, as for example by lobbying for specific laws or regulations that would benefit their members but could be harmful for society at large, seems limited if not inexistent. While the smaller associations largely focus on the provision of services, those larger associations that have the ability to advance the collective interests of their member firms seem to have used this ability only to a limited extent, mostly in order to prevent the introduction of new contradictory laws and regulations that might have resulted in negative outcomes for the business community in general. Moreover, we found that in Russia's current political environment the voice of business seems at least temporarily have lost its influence on political decision-making, making it currently almost impossible even for the largest foreign business associations to advance the collective interest of their members.
